Union Intelligence in the Civil...
Charles River Editors
Americans have long been fascinated by the Civil War, marveling at the size of the battles, the leadership of the generals, and the courage of the soldiers. Since the war's start over 150 years ago, the battles have been subjected to endless debate among historians and the generals themselves. The Civil War was the deadliest conflict in American history, and had the two sides realized it would take four years and inflict over a million casualties, it might not have been fought. Since it did, however, historians and history buffs alike have been studying and analyzing the biggest battles ever since.
In September 1862, the Union had no intelligence service worthy of the name. It had detectives, scouts, scattered networks of informants, balloons, signal flags, and a great deal of luck, but the federal government did not have a coordinated system, to the extent that military commanders did not know enemy troop strength. In fact, General George McClellan spent most of his time in command of the Army of the Potomac dramatically overestimating the size of Robert E. Lee's Confederate army in front of him, and it would inform how he fought at Antietam on September 17, 1862. At that battle, McClellan believed Lee outnumbered him because his intelligence chief, Allan Pinkerton, had told him so.
By the end of the war, the Union would be running the most sophisticated intelligence operations in American history to that point. The government eventually forged an integrated, all-source, professional service that fed the commanding generals daily reports on enemy strength, disposition, morale, and intent. The Union also successfully maintained a network of spies inside the Confederate capital that intercepted enemy signal traffic; read Southern newspapers for what the editors had let slip, and used escaped slaves as sources of intelligence and treated their testimony as it deserved to be treated.
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