The Corsair in the war zone
Ralph Delahaye Paine
Maison d'édition: Librorium Editions
Synopsis
THE task of the American Navy in the great conflict was performed exceedingly well, but so very quietly that even now the merits of the achievement are realized only by those who knew how near the German submarine campaign came to winning the war. There was no blacker period than the spring of 1917 when the losses of Allied merchant shipping were mounting toward a million tons a month, and the Admiralty was well aware that England stood face to face with starvation and defeat unless this piracy could soon be checked. It was when Admiral Sims cabled to his own Government, from London, “Briefly stated, I consider that at the present moment we are losing the war”; when Admiral Jellicoe privately admitted, “It is impossible for us to go on if losses like this continue”; and when Lord Balfour could see no escape from the same tragic conclusion. The facts were purposely concealed from the people of both countries, and even after the declaration of war the attitude of the American mind was all too leisurely, while the British grimly hung on and tightened their belts with the tenacity of the breed. The battleship squadrons of the Grand Fleet still dominated the surface of the Seven Seas, but they were helpless to aid in this vital problem. It was perceived that the chief hope of salvation was in massing destroyers to protect the converging trade routes of the Irish Sea and the English Channel and thereby increasing the supply of food and material. For this service the British Navy was able to spare a flotilla of less than a score of these craft, a patrol force obviously inadequate. These were the reasons why the fleet of thirty-five fast and powerful American destroyers was sent across the Atlantic, and why Queenstown was chosen as the strategic base port.
Disponible depuis: 10/02/2024.
